

The Malay Peninsula and Europe in the Past,

By Dr. Hendrik P. N. Muller

ABSTRACTED FROM THE DUTCH

BY P. C. HOYNCK VAN PAPENDRECHT.

In the course of last year two Dutch reviews have devoted space to the country which chiefly interests the readers of our Journal. In "*Onze Eeuw*" (June 1913) Dr. E. B. Kielstra wrote an article on "*Het Maleische Schiereiland*" (The Malay Peninsula) in which reference is made to the works of Swettenham, Phillips and Wright & Reid. And in "*De Gids*" (November 1913) Dr. Hendrik P. N. Muller published the first—or historical—part of an essay entitled "*Britsch Malakka*" (British Malacca)¹ which is to form a chapter of his work on Asia of which the first volume appeared in 1912. Dr. Muller has spent a couple of years in various parts of Asia and to the vast material then collected he has been since adding by extensive researches in archives and literature.

The following is an abstract of the chapter of Dr. Muller's work which has now appeared and which depicts the relations of European nations with the part of the Peninsula that now forms the British sphere of influence and with the present colony of the Straits Settlements. The subject seemed to me of sufficient interest to the members of the Straits Branch R. A. S. to tempt me to undertake its translation; and the task attracted me for more than one reason. Dr. Muller and I have been friends since the age of fifteen and he was the last to see me off when I first set out for the shores referred to in his present narrative. On the other hand my own happy recollections of what has been to me the land of free trade and fair play made it pleasant for me to render my fellow members of the Straits Branch R. A. S. acquainted with the results of Dr. Muller's labour and with his vivid description of ancient doings in and about the Straits.

In my abstract I have, while slightly abridging the original, rendered as faithfully as possible the author's own wording and that of his numerous interesting quotations. In translating the latter I many now and then have been too literal, but then my purpose was to maintain the quaint picturesque character of the language of olden days.

(1). As other continental nations (vide French and German maps) the Dutch apply the name Malacca to the whole of the Peninsula, as also did the treaty of London. P. C. H. v. P.

Mr. C. Otto Blagden had promised to assist me in revising the text of my abstract; with the aid of his knowledge both of the Dutch language and of the subject under review he has carried this out in such a generous way, that his revision has extended into an invaluable cooperation for which I wish to record my profound gratitude.

P. C. H. v. P.

The political relations of the Straits with Europe began in 1511, when the Portuguese, very shortly after their first appearance in Western India, and nearly a century ahead of the Dutch, came into contact with the Malay Peninsula. In that year a fleet under the great Affonso de Albuquerque sailed from Cochin and wrested the town of Malacca from the ruler of Johor¹.

The object of this expedition was to obtain a firm footing at a point commanding the great sea-way, a port of call where ships trading from India to China and the Spice Islands could refresh their crew and provisions, an emporium for merchandise and produce. The Portuguese made Malacca into a fortress of such solid construction that its demolition, three centuries later, involved a considerable outlay. It was from this stronghold that the Portuguese traded all over the Archipelago and opened branches there; it was from Malacca that Antonio de Brito sailed to Ternate and in 1522 built the first fortified settlement, Sao Joao Bautista, in those islands. During their short reign in the Archipelago Malacca held the place which Batavia was to occupy under Dutch rule. The settlement at Malacca was subordinate to the Portuguese Vice-Roy of India.

The Dutch relations with the Peninsula started even before the foundation of the Oost-Indische Compagnie. It was Jacob van Heemskerk who anchored off Johor in 1602 and was welcomed by its ruler as a much-needed ally against the detested Portuguese. This prince—like most of his successors, remained throughout on friendly terms with the Dutch and often gave them direct support. “It may be said that amongst all the kings of India none has proved so straight and favourably disposed in all his dealings with us².” He began in the same year by giving van Heemskerk shelter for the purpose of waylaying a Portuguese “caraque” on its voyage from Macao to Portugal. The capture of this vessel was in retaliation for the murder of seventeen Dutch sailors in Macao in the previous year. The big clumsy ship was eventually overpowered and her cargo taken to Amsterdam. The sale was quite an event; the curios, lacquer ware, silk and porcelain made a

(1). Dr. R. Martin (*Die Inlandstaemme der Malayischen Halbinsel*, Jena 1905) maintains that in the beginning of that century the whole of the Peninsula, including Malacca, was under Siamese supremacy.

(2). Valentijn. *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, Vol. 5. 1726 p. 339.

great sensation not only amongst the upper classes in the Netherlands, but also in other countries. The total value of the sale amounted to not less than three and a half million guilders. Even nowadays the Dutch indicate the finest and thinnest porcelain by the name *kraakporselein*, after the *caraque* (*kraak*) which carried this valuable cargo¹.

At the request of the Sultan, van Heemskerck took a Johor envoy home with him². He left Jacob Buys with the Sultan "to look after our affairs and counting house³." Our headman "Buysen appears to have lain here till about 1605 and to have been relieved by the upper merchant Cornelis Franck. The factory still continued in 1609⁴." Two years afterwards Johor seems to have had a chance of playing a pre-eminent part in the history of the Far East. In case the new head-office in Java should prove a failure, the Dutch had resolved to transfer it to Johor⁵. But this necessity did not arise and the fixed establishment at Johor soon saw the end of its career⁶. According to a letter from Governor-General Coen to the Directors of January 1st 1614⁷ the "Compagnie" had then still a "lodge in Joor." But when the Acheenese burned down the Sultan's town about the same period⁸ the Compagnie desisted for good from the possession of a factory. Undoubtedly the poverty of the country had been a disappointing factor. The Sultan even asked Matelief for the loan of "a few hundred rixdollars, up to a thousand⁹." However the harmony remained undisturbed. In 1614 the Compagnie took the side of Johor against "Atchijn" in spite of the fact that she had a factory in the latter country. The Sultan offered to permit the Dutch to build a fort at the mouth of the Johor river against the

(1). R. Fruin, *Verspreide Geschriften*. Vol. 3. The Hague, 1901, p. 295. *De Navorscher*. Vol. 19. 1869.

Documenten voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in het Oosten by P. A. Tiele, Historisch Genootschap. Vol. 6.

(2). "In 1604 an ambassador of that king was in this country" says Pieter van Dam in his "*Beschrijvinge van de Oost-Ind. Comp.*" in manuscript in the State Archives at the Hague, terminated in 1701. This ambassador returned from Holland with Matelief in 1606 (Tiele. *De Europeers*. I. p. 61).

(3). Valentijn V. p. 359.

(4). Valentijn V. p. 359.

(5). *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak 1602-1865*, by E. Netscher. *Verhandelingen Bataviaasch Genootschap*, 1870. p. 28.

(6). "How long afterwards it remained in existence, is unknown to me; but "I almost believe that not long afterwards our counting-house was broken up," says Valentijn, V.

(7). *Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, by P. A. Tiele. I. the Hague, 1886, p. 60.

(8). Netscher, p. 39.

(9). Valentijn, V. p. 335.

common Portuguese enemy¹. But the cost of this was considered out of proportion to the possible results. Neither did the Compagnie comply with the king's pressing request in 1640 "to make a fort for his security at Batoesouwer, that is on the river Jhoor²." The town of Batu Sawar was situated "5 or 6 miles up the "river of Djohore" and was the capital where the prince "mostly resided³." The Dutch have never had a fortified settlement in the country.

At the time when the Dutch made their appearance in the Far East, the power of the Portuguese was already on its decline. Jan Huygen van Linschoten, when visiting Goa (1583-1589) had found carelessness, incapacity, neglect of duty and corruption prevailing amongst the colonial officials who chiefly owed their appointment to high rank, nepotism and influence rather than to their own merits. Linschoten thought it a miracle that their ships did not all perish through want of care in stowage and navigation. Their losses on this account were enormous. A great part of their profits arose from piracy, a common evil in these days especially in "Malaxe waters" and carried on by Chinese, Malays and in their colonial youth also by the Dutch. About 1580 the only places in the Peninsula and the Archipelago where Portugal maintained garrisons, were Malacca, Amboyna and Tidore⁴. It is true the capital invested by Portugal in the East greatly exceeded that of the Dutch rival Compagnie (Coen valued it at 50 million guilders⁵, which figure includes that of the Spaniards) but their strength was not in proportion and a vigorous stroke delivered at their mighty stronghold Malacca would break it entirely and render them harmless.

With this object in view Admiral Matelief closed, as early as 1606, an alliance with Johor, the first of many treaties between the Dutch and that country. In case of success the Dutch were to hold Malacca and to have the sole right to trade with the Sultan's capital free of duty, all other Europeans being absolutely excluded. But the first attempt failed. In 1640 the Compagnie again undertook the siege of Malacca, maintained it for five months and on the 14th of January 1641 succeeded in taking the fortress⁶. The final result was obtained by 650 Netherlanders "being all the "sound people left, soldiers and sailors. On our side more than "1500 officers, soldiers and sea-faring men have lost their lives

(1). Letter from Adryaen van der Dussen, upper merchant, to Governor General Pieter Both of November 10th, 1614, Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, I. p. 76.

(2). Governor-General van Diemen to the Directors, November 30th, 1640.

(3). Valentijn, V. pp. 335 and 359.

(4). Tiele. *De Europeers* etc. 4th series, IV. pp. 158 and 178.

(5). do. 5th, ,, II. p. 287.

(6). *Realia Register op de Generale Resolutien van het Kasteel Batavia, 1635-1805*. Leiden, 1832.

“chiefly from infectious disease¹.” The Johor people had lent powerful support; the Compagnie “would never have become master of that strong place without their assistance².”

For nearly two centuries the Dutch flag was to wave from the Malacca fortress; not until 1825 was it to disappear for good.

The loss of the dominating position on the great high-way to the Archipelago and the Far East was fatal to the power of the Portuguese in those countries. How fully they realised this themselves is shown by a letter written in 1673 to Governor-General Joan Maetsuyker at Batavia by a Governor of Macao. Bitterly complaining of competition by Dutch freeburghers from Batavia “on Lampacao, an island in the vicinity of this town Macao,” the letter goes on: “It seems to us that you ought to be content with “possessing the whole of India and to let us live in peace in this “little district and what is still left under our jurisdiction, since “you are now the larger power in India. For do by others as you “would be done by³.” Six years later the Batavia Government “even writes to Malacca “not to respect ship’s certificates of the “Portuguese, but to treat them as natives.” (!)⁴

The situation of the Portuguese population which the Dutch found in Malacca after the conquest affords a distinct illustration of the difference between Portuguese and Dutch colonial policies in those days. It also gives the key to the surprising difference which the modern traveller observes in the remains of the language and the descendants of both nations in countries which they have consecutively occupied. Portuguese blood and language still survive in Indo China⁵ and in Ceylon; the Dutch language has entirely disappeared and in Indo China descendants of the Dutch race are a great exception. In Malacca we notice the same kind of thing. On taking possession of the town, where the hardships of the siege and infectious diseases had caused great mortality, the Compagnie found among the survivors a great many Portuguese unofficials. The State had opened up the trade and monopolised it for some time in order to defray the expense of its costly establishments, for which the ordinary revenue of taxes and dues was insufficient. But no more than the Dutch and British Companies in a later period the Portuguese Government had been able to keep its monopoly intact and it had allowed private trade on payment of high duties. This had attracted numerous private citizens to the colonies as permanent settlers “thinking no more of “Portugal, but sustaining and enriching themselves with the,

(1). Pieter van Dam.

(2). Letter from Council of India to Directors 9th-11th July, 1645. *Tiele Bouwstoffen*, III p. 232.

(3). *Dagregister van het Kasteel Batavia*, 1673.

(4). do. p. 597.

(5). *Azie Gespiegeld* by Dr. Hendrik P. N. Muller I. Utrecht, 1912, p. 220.

“advantages of India as if they were natives and had no other fatherland¹.” In their intercourse with the natives they used the Portuguese language, which down to the present day has not died out in Malacca.

“The Jesuits and the principal clergy with the most notable citizens were transported to Nagapatnam with a large amount of treasure valued at a few hundred thousand reals (dollars), the remainder of the Portuguese to Batavia, none but a few Portuguese families being left in the town².” Notwithstanding this large exodus “1603 souls of Portuguese were still to be found within the town of Malacca and its territory³” only eleven months after the conquest. And in the following year they were still so numerous that “of the most prominent Portuguese citizens 3 persons were appointed magistrates to administer justice during the ensuring year together with 4 Netherlanders⁴.” This institution of magistrates was not to lead a long life⁵. As late as 1726, according to Valentijn’s volume published in that year, Dutch clergymen now and then preached in the Portuguese language. Gradually most of these Portuguese died out for want of new blood from the home country, or they were absorbed by the native races; but even now they have not entirely disappeared.

Adhering to the system of toleration then prevailing in the mother country the Compagnie allowed freedom of religion in the new territory, but not equal rights, and Roman Catholic divine service was at first limited to private dwellinghouses. And now and then an echo resounds of the far distant beginning of the eighty years’ war. Portuguese clergymen continued to visit Malacca under pretext of breaking their voyage; but when they prolonged their stay for months the Council at Batavia wrote to the President (as the officer in charge was then styled) 6th December, 1645: “to purify Malacca’s territory of this heap of nuisance in order that the Lusitanian and other inhabitants may remain loyal to their oath to the Netherland Compagnie, the rupture of which is the daily object of the simulating and faithless practices of those maintainers of Romish doctrines, and not to tolerate the papists there longer than till the departure of the ships in which they have come⁶.” Governor Johan Thijsen appears to have cherished similar feelings; 15th December, 1646 he recommends the removal out of the Portuguese population of “all that is

(1). Governor-General Ant. van Diemen to Directors, 12th December, 1642. *Bouwstoffen*, III. Introduction.

(2). Pieter van Dam.

(3). *Dagregister*, December, 1641.

(4). do.

(5). Dr. E. C. Godée Molsbergen. *De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika. Fan van Riebeeck*. Amsterdam, 1912. p. 183.

(6). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III p. 271.

“white or mestizo, for they are worse than devouring wolves for this place, only living in idleness and usury on the sweat and labour of the poor black inhabitants¹.” He specially urges the deportation of the Jesuits: “the plague is less harmful than those wolves in sheeps’—clothing².”

But when peace was restored (1648) and the supremacy of the “United East-India Company” in Southern Asia had been rendered unassailable, softer feelings began to prevail and there are now in existence churches constructed in the Portuguese time which have been continually used by the Roman Catholic communion. In 1712 the Protestant “Dutch congregation” mustered “not more than 202 members, but that of the Roman Catholics was six times as large, consisting of few Europeans but many mestizos and far more blacks who had remained rusting (!) there since the time of the Portuguese³.” In 1735 the Batavia Government decreed “that the head-administrator “not being able to prove his allegiance to the Reformed Church, he shall not be appointed to the post of commissaris politicus⁴.” But whilst the privileges of the ruling church were maintained—in the same way as they still prevail now in Roman Catholic countries—, religious liberty was not interfered with and no hostility was shown to the Roman Catholics; in 1782 the Compagnie gave instructions to Malacca “to observe the old arrangements and customs about the Roman Catholic inhabitants and not to give them cause for complaint⁵.”

The Portuguese had been in the habit of levying duties on goods imported and exported and on ships passing through whether they “broke cargo” or not. These duties varied from 2 to 9 per cent⁶ during the Portuguese domination including the period in which Portugal belonged to Spain. The Compagnie maintained this system but “with distinction of nations” and often “with some moderation⁷”, except in regard to the Portuguese who in their day had been in the habit of exacting duty from the Dutch. It was only on payment of duty that foreign ships were granted permits, without which they were liable to confiscation, especially those belonging to Malays, Moors (Muhammadan Indians) and Chinese. As a rule British ships were exempted. The Compagnie began by fixing the duty at “five per cent of exports and nine of imports⁸.” Three years afterwards Portuguese vessels on passing

(1). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 331.

(2). do. p. 329.

(3). Valentijn, V.

(4). *Realia*.

(5). do.

(6). *Dagregister*, 1645.

(7). Pieter van Dam.

(8). Instruction for Vice-Governor Jeremias van Vliet, 9th September, 1642. Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 78.

through are taxed $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent¹ which they paid "under protest²." "The duty on passing through shall also be paid by the Coast Moors³ who traffic at Atchin, Pera and Queda and for that purpose touch at Malacca⁴." In 1664 the Netherlands Indian Government sent instructions to Malacca, to "demand from every Portuguese vessel according to her size and without manipulating her cargo: of a small yacht 300 rixdollars, of a middle sized ship 400 rixdollars and of a large ship 500 rixdollars. And if anyone shall undertake to break cargo at Malacca, he shall, the same as other traders, pay the Compagnie the toll of 10 per cent on his entire cargo⁵." But the damage accruing to the Compagnie's own trade from this private commerce, especially by Indians, became so considerable that a resolution was passed at Batavia in 1678: "to raise the duty payable at Malacca by Moors and other private traders to 20 per cent, being very prejudicial to the Compagnie's own business⁶"; and "that all native traders without the Compagnie's permits shall be encumbered with arrest. Those provided with Danish or English ship's certificates" (from the factories of those nations in India) "shall pay 20 per cent on their first visit and to the certificates of the Portuguese no respect need to be shown⁷." In 1679 the Governor was ordered to "admit the Portuguese, English and other Europeans" on payment of 20 per cent duty. But in 1688, evidently by order of the Directors, this measure was repealed and orders were given "not to land there any packages or merchandise from foreign vessels," to which was added in 1689: "not even if they offer double duty and the whole remainder of their cargoes⁸." The year 1692 brought a new modification: "the toll was again fixed at 13 per cent of imports and exports there discharged or sold." In 1744 this figure was reduced to 6 per cent⁸.

All this tends to show that the monopoly system, which the Portuguese and Spaniards had applied, as far as practicable to each other as well as to other nations, was not maintained with absolute vigour during the Compagnie's reign in Malacca.

For many years she made strenuous exertions to obtain an absolute monopoly with regard to tin, the chief product of the soil of the Peninsula, which was then extracted on a relatively large scale in the so-called tin-quarters (Perak, Kedah, the islands of

(1). *Realia* 1648.

(2). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 256.

(3). People from the Coromandel and Malabar Coast.

(4). *Realia*, 1646.

(5). *Dagrgister*, p. 110.

(6). do. p. 425.

(7). do. p. 597 and *Realia* 1679.

(8). *Realia*.

Ujong Salang on the Peninsula's N. W. Coast, Singgora, etc.) Even in the Portuguese time the profits of the tin trade had filled the Government treasury as well as the pockets of Government officials and private individuals. And this metal continued to be the main article of trade as long as the Dutch flag waved over Malacca, and was the motive of Dutch intercourse with several of the native states on the Peninsula¹.

The export of tin was chiefly in the hands of "Moors" from "Bengale and Choromandel" and from the West Coast of India, who bought up the metal in the tin-quarters. Acheen and Malacca were the centres of this trade. On the 11th July, 1642, the "King" of Kedah, whom Matelief had visited in 1606, agreed with the Compagnie to let her have half of the tin-production of his country at a fixed price and not to admit ships without the Compagnie's permit². An attempt was made to obtain a similar contract from Perak which was richest in tin. But that country refused, giving as reason its vassalage to Acheen, which had maintained its claims on that state, although since the conquest of Malacca it had waived those on Pahang³. But the Batavia Government did not leave the matter there. "Considering that the Moors "snap up all the tin in Perak under our very noses and stuff the "country full with their piecegoods⁴," Governor-General Van der Lijn and his councillors resolved on 3rd June 1647 to prohibit Moor navigation to Acheen as well as to all Malay ports⁵. This resolution was notified at "Soeratte and Choromandel," which imported large quantities of tin for local use, to the "regents" (*i.e.* "native authorities") of those ports who were subject to the Great Moghul. The Compagnie thereby exposed her factories in those places (the one at Surat is still inhabited to-day) to the wrath of the Great Moghul's people; but conscious of her power she did not hesitate. When the Surat office was attacked and looted in April 1648⁶ the Governor-General and Council resolved "to redress matters by arms." Nothing daunted, the Compagnie seized "two royal ships from Mocha with a cash capital of eleven hundred thousand guilders." This produced a wholesome terror; the local Governor bowed his head and acquiesced in everything. His ships were then restored to him. Van der Lijn and his Council were thus able to report that in 1648 no vessels "from Zuratte and "Bengala appeared about Atjeh and the tin-places, since the direc-

(1). For the Compagnie's relations with Siamese vassal states see *Azie Gespiegeld*, I. chapter Siam p. 148-153.

(2). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 106/7.

(3). do. p. XI.

(4). do. III. p. 343. This, in brief, is the purport of the preamble of the resolution.

(5). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 354 and following pages.

(6). do. p. 372.

“teur Arent Barentsen has declined to grant permits.” The “Soenan Mataram,” predecessor of the present Susuhunan of Surakarta (Java) also prohibited the navigation of his people to Perak¹. With Acheen no high handed proceedings could be resorted to. The Dutch were in the habit of keeping a factory there; the native power was not to be trifled with and it also dominated a great part of the West-Coast of Sumatra, with which the Dutch had opened up a trade of some importance. But Van der Lijn succeeded in arranging with the Sultan that he and the Compagnie were to have the sole right of purchasing tin in Perak. No great benefit to Acheen could arise from this, since the Dutch prevented other purchasers from coming to the Acheenese tin-market. The result was that the English left Acheen in 1649.

All these measures rendered the Dutch factories in the tin-quarters less indispensable and important; and a tendency set in to draw all the tin to Malacca which for a brief space of time promised to become a second Batavia. In 1649 the Compagnie collected in Malacca “770,000 pounds of tin, which is an extraordinary quantity²”; the greater part of it came from Perak. About this time some of the permanent Dutch stations in the tin-quarters (*i.e.* those at Kedah, Ujong Salang and Singgora) began to decline.

As regards Ujong Salang it was even resolved at Batavia in 1661 “to discontinue the navigation and for the present it “shall not be visited by our inhabitants unless the regents there “should invite us again³.”

Henceforth the name of Singgora is only to reappear once in the “Dagregister” when in 1675 an “envoy of the King of “Sangora” visited Batavia to solicit a renewal of the friendship which had existed under the late Governor-General van Diemen.

But on Kedah, more important although like Ujong Salang⁴ “subject of the Siammer⁵,” a tight hold was kept. The instructions to “break up the office there” (1656) also contained orders “for the blockade of its port⁶.” This command was repeated three years later; the Governor was told to “blockade the river “of Kedah as closely as possible⁷”; in 1663 the “Dagregister” mentions that “the river of Queda is still being blockaded,” and in 1664 the Netherlands Indian Government resolves, in spite of the King’s wish for peace⁸, “to continue the blockade of Queda

(1). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. 438/9.

(2). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 160.

(3). *Dagregister* 1661.

(4). Gov. Gen. van der Lijn in Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, IV. p. 233.

(5). *Dagregister*, 1645.

(6). *Realia*.

(7). *Realia*, 1659.

(8). *Dagregister*, 1663.

“on the old footing¹.” Kedah did not bear this meekly; in 1676 Governor Bort writes to Batavia that the “Compagnie’s cruising sloops (chaloupen) had been assailed many times about Pera and Queda by Malay pirates; but these had been lustily battered; however one sloop lying in Pera’s river had been attacked unawares by two of these pirates’ vessels and its crew with the exception of two had been murdered.” And shortly afterwards he reports “that about Dinghdingh² another sloop with a crew of six had been rushed by the Quedaze pirates owing to the crew’s own carelessness. All of the crew were severely wounded and the scoundrels could not be overtaken³.”

In 1651 the Perak “lodge only serving for the tin-trade” (Valentijn) “was ransacked and an atrocious murder committed on our servants there⁴.” This led to a resolution at Batavia (1651) “with the approbation of the King of Acheen” to “send a military and naval force there to demand satisfaction.” In 1655 peace was restored but did not lead to the reopening of the factory. And already in 1656 a resolution follows “to blockade its port and that of Atchin with armed vessels if reasonable satisfaction be refused⁵.” But Perak persisted in its attitude. “The prince sends the tin to Acheen in defiance of us, declining to give the Compagnie its competent half share, riding the high horse,” and this in spite of his heavy indebtedness to the Compagnie. “Of the debt of the King and his chiefs in Pera there still remains to be paid 135,345 guilders, which will apparently result in nothing” says the Dagregister of 1663. Not a trifling sum in those days! Putting on the velvet glove the Compagnie resolved in 1664 “to animate the Perak people to the supply of tin⁵” and “to allow free access to the Acheenese on their arrival off the Pera-river and on their return not to take away more than half of their tin, as before⁶.” And still Perak did not bow its head. In 1676 Governor Bort writes to Batavia: “Those of Pera comport themselves but moderately with regard to their contract for the sole supply of their tin to the Honourable Compagnie and for refusing entrance to the English and all other foreign nations⁶.” And three years afterwards the murder occurs of some sailors of the squadron lying off the Perak-river, in which the King was evidently implicated⁶. At last in 1680 a contract is concluded with the King and Chiefs of Perak whereby “the Commandant Adriaen Wijlant, lying in the mouth of the

(1). *Realia*.

(2). *Azie Gespiegeld*, I. p. 150.

(3). *Dagregister*.

(4). Pieter van Dam.

(5). *Realia*.

(6). *Dagregister*.

“Perase-river was authorised to attack with arms all Malay vessels, not provided with a “chiap” or who declined to comply with a summons of ours to come on board¹.” A Dutch factory was maintained in the eighteenth century almost until its end². in 1758 a resolution is passed at Batavia “to construct a small stone fort at Pera” and “to put the Countinghouse there in charge of a bookkeeper,” who in 1771 was replaced by an ensign³. In 1782 and 1787 this fort is referred to as still existing and garrisoned. Then it follows Malacca in its downfall.

Besides tin, the Compagnie exported from Malacca pepper, gold and elephants, both of the latter for modest amounts. The pepper originated from Johor, sometimes “in abundance⁴,” but owing to the situation of that country most of its production found its way to Batavia. The gold came from Kedah, the elephants from Kedah and Ujong Salang⁵. These animals were sold in the Compagnie’s lodges in Siam and Bengal; in 1645 the latter has “eight head from Malacca unsold⁶.” The large but sparsely populated Peninsula produced no other exports of any significance.

A further source of income was the importation, especially of piecegoods, which were for the greater part of Indian manufacture; the Compagnie called them “cloths.” But here the “Moors” were fervent competitors, since their ships, without a special resolution at Batavia to that effect, were again admitted to the Malacca-factory provided they did not offend against the tin regulations. In 1674 Governor Balthasar Bort had to issue “a certain placard” against money-lending by Dutch officials on the continent of India to “Moors of Cormandel” for the purpose of buying “cloths” and selling them at Malacca to the detriment of the Compagnie’s business⁷. For the rest the inward manifests of vessels entering Malacca show comparatively small importations, mostly for private use at the factories.

The combined profits and dues at Malacca did not cover the high expenditure. The large fort required a numerous garrison; in 1649 it counted 477 Netherlanders besides 380 seamen⁸; in 1663 it numbered 286⁹. The reduction of the fort to a size justifying a diminution of the garrison was repeatedly urged, since Portugal was broken and the English Company still in its infancy and in need of everything, from ink and paper to money, ships and

(1). *Dagregister*, p. 366.

(2). *Azie Gespiegeld*, I. p. 149.

(3). *Realia*.

(4). For instance in 1649. Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 460/3.

(5). Valentijn, V.

(6). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 233.

(7). *Dagregister*, p. 91/2.

(8). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 372 and 463.

(9). *Dagregister*.

victuals. She had not even been able to cooperate against Spain, as had been arranged in Europe in 1620; she had been obliged to recall her ships from the Philippines and to abandon her factories in the Moluccos and the Banda Islands; against 28 English ships in the Far East in 1622 the Dutch could muster 83¹. But diminishing the size of the fortress meant such a heavy expense that the plan had to be given up and the large garrison maintained. The unwholesome state of the fortress having been amended shortly after the conquest, which had put an end to "the aversion of many "of ours to that town²;" it now numbered, besides the garrison, a few thousand inhabitants, many of whom lived on the Compagnie; in 1665 for instance there were over 800 slaves, 21 Netherlands citizens and "900 Portuguese, mestizos, blacks, Moors, Chinese, 'Javanese and Malays³," all of whom found the whole or part of their living in merchantile occupations. Under these circumstances a surplus balance was most unusual, one of these exceptions occurring in 1665, owing to—and during—the short administration of Jan van Riebeeck, the founder of Cape Colony. He collected:

	Guilders.
Besides "duties of the previous year	62.500
"Profits on merchandise at Malacca	168.100
Pera	3.400
	<hr/>
Guilders	234.000
Whilst the charges amounted to gld.	230.000
	<hr/>

so that Malacca shows to the good gld. 4.000⁴."

But as a rule the administrators were less capable or less fortunate and (as in the days of the Portuguese) the revenue remained below the expenditure, albeit from other causes than competition from the officials, by which Portugal had suffered⁵. The year 1645 showed a deficit of gld. 80.000.—; in 1661 it was slightly larger, Malacca and dependencies yielding a profit of gld. 126.000.—as against gld. 207.000.—in "charges"; in 1663 the deficit was again the same⁶. The turnover was too small in comparison to the heavy expenses; in 1644 the stock on hand and the outstanding debts did not come up to half a million guilders⁷, in

(1). Tiele. *De Europeers*, etc. 5th series, II. p. 284.

(2) G. G. van Diemen and Councillors to Directors 23rd December, 1644 in Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 196.

(3). *Dagregister*.

(4). *Dagregister*.

(5). Tiele. *De Europeers* etc. 5th series, II. p. 291.

(6). *Dagregister*.

(7). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 197/233.

1661 they amount to gld. 700.000.—, shortly thereafter to gld. 900.000².—And more and more the Compagnie tried to draw the trade to Batavia, where she concentrated her strength and working power. In 1778 the Netherlands Indian Government went as far as to give orders to Malacca and Palembang “not to suffer any longer the navigation of Chinese junks in and through the Straits of Malacca to other destinations than Batavia¹.”

The importance of Malacca to the Dutch lay not so much in the direct advantages to be gained by trading with the Peninsula, as in the power which its possession afforded of dominating the commercial sea-way to the Archipelago and the Far East, and the consequent necessity of preventing other nations from establishing themselves at such a strong position. Nearly every ship put in there or passed close by. In the “daily register” of the castle at Batavia (as published down to 1680) there is hardly one place so often named as Malacca.

In 1675 it even received the visit of a vessel “with an ambassador from the King of Abassina, in the land of “Africa,” who was on his way to Batavia with a letter and a present of horses and “forest-donkeys” by which that prince solicited the continuation of the friendship which his deceased father had enjoyed².

In Malacca the Compagnie possessed a key which she knew how to use effectively, and not only so against Asiatics. In 1643 she captured off Malacca no less a person than the Captain-General of Macao, together with his ship, although it was an English one³. And not long afterwards she stopped competition to Japan in the important article rayskins, then of vital interest to her factory in Siam⁴ and of which a Portuguese frigate tried to bring a cargo to Japan for account of the “Danmark Compagnie.” The vessel was in command of a Dutchman, Barent Pessaert, who had entered the Danish service, become local “president of a factory and had collected 25.000 rayskins in Trangebare and the Portuguese town Negapatnam. But in the Malax straits the ship has been “arrested.” The Compagnie had not yet obtained the trade monopoly in Japan and therefore based her claim on the grounds that Pessaert had tried “to pass Malacca without paying toll” and that he was “a fugitive from Batavia and served foreign princes “contrary to his oath.” The matter was eventually settled, there being no sufficient legal ground with regard to the foreign countries involved to justify confiscation; but the Compagnie was to effect the sale of the rayskins in Japan for Pessaert’s account⁵.

(1). *Realia*.

(2). *Dagregister*.

(3). *Tiele. Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 170.

(4). *Azie Gespiegeld*, I. p. 156 and following.

(5). *Tiele. Bouwstoffen*, III. p. 195.

There were many other instances of Hollanders, entering into the service of foreign competitors, despite their oath to the Compagnie, and securing the best situations on account of their rare experience and pluck, their unrivalled all-round knowledge, practical sense, skill and energy. The great Caron of Japan went over to the French and deserves some of the credit of their present protectorate over Madagascar; other Dutchmen were engaged in the abortive French expeditions to the Archipelago and in the Swedish attempts to get there. The Peninsula even witnessed a case where some Dutch sailors deserted to the Malay enemy and lived with the natives. They were: "Johannes Gabrielsen of Haarlem and Jacob Hendrikxen of Harlingen who in 1674 with the sloop de Roos left their cruising station off Malacca and after committing a horrible murder on the entire crew of a certain Malay vessel, went over to our enemy the King of Queda and there had themselves circumcised in the Moorish fashion." Four years later they both fell in the Compagnie's hands and were "doomed to be hanged with a cord to the gallows so that death ensues¹."

After the general pacification in 1648 the chronic state of war gradually gave way to more settled conditions. Murder and piracy diminished in consequence, but they still occurred and sometimes the Compagnie's own people were the offenders. In 1663 "an execrable murder was committed about Queda by our people, those of the barque den Exter in which event 30 to 33 souls of a Moorish vessels were exterminated. Three women were violated and smothered in the sea with a bag of rice tied round the neck. The ringleaders amongst these monsters were Jan Gassion of Malta, commander of the barque, Jacob Jacobs of Hoorn, Jan Dirksen of Rotterdam and Hendrik Avelst of Drilst. These have been executed; they had their right hands chopped off, were broken on the wheel and beheaded." The rest of the gang were ordered by van Riebeeck to be hanged or to "have the sword passed over their heads²." With the progress of the English in Asia, their freebooters also took a hand in troubling Malay waters and more than one of them were sentenced and punished at Malacca.

In the long list of Malacca administrators the only one who has made more than a passing name for himself in colonial history is Jan van Riebeeck (or Riebeeck) who was nominated on the 18th September, 1622, after a ten years' stay at the cape of Good Hope. This was a promotion but not in title; he continued in his Cape rank of Commandeur to which was added "and president;" he never attained the coveted title of Governor, let alone that of Councillor ordinarius or extraordinarius; but in those days Malacca

(1). *Dagregister*, 1678.

(2). *Dagregister*. (An old punishment in the Netherlands, involving degradation.)

was a far more agreeable residence than the small ten year old white settlement amongst the Hottentots, which was only meant to be a port of call and had nothing to boast of but its climate. Many years afterwards his own granddaughter stayed a few days at the Cape on her way to Holland and, fresh from the luxury and comfort of Batavia, she turned up her nose at the ancestral foundation¹. Jan van Riebeeck was held by his Directors in only moderate consideration. In Tonquin he had been found indulging in the common evil of trading for his private account and as to the Cape he had influenced the resolution to found that settlement by an optimistic forecast that it would be able to cover its expenses, which view had not been justified. No more than anybody else could the Seventeen Gentlemen (the Directors) then dream of the grand future which was—and still is—in store for van Riebeeck's creation. In those times of strenuous development of the Dutch race in every direction they did not consider the results of those ten years at the Cape as something extraordinary. But they saw no objection to his appointment at Malacca, which was considered a post of minor importance. From the date of his arrival there, 1st November, 1662, diligence and order characterised his administration. To the financial results which he obtained in business reference has already been made. They were appreciated in a letter from the Directors in Amsterdam to Batavia of 8th March, 1666: "It is a notable cargo attaining the sum of 1576 thousand guilders that has lately left Malacca in ten ships for Bengale, the (Coromandel) Coast, Ceylon, Suratte and Persia²." He had then already been relieved of his charge at his own request: "On May, 29th-30th 1665 it was decreed at Batavia to send Commandeur Balthasar Bort to Malacca for three years at 180 guilders a month to replace commandeur Jan van Riebeeck, there presiding³." On 23rd-24th November of the same year the Governor-General and Council resolved: "Whereas the secretary of their Hon'ble Council has been elected Governor of Amboyna, to fill this vacancy by the nomination of the Hon'ble Joan van Riebeeck, lately commandeur and president at Malacca⁴." He lived for twelve quiet years in this capacity of secretary to the Batavia Government. It is then recorded in the *Dagregister* of 18th January, 1677: "Having been confined to bed for over 5 months by a lingering illness the Hon'ble Secretary to the Hon'ble Council, the Hon'ble Mr. Joan van Riebeeck, fell asleep in the Lord this morning" and on the 19th that he "was buried in state in the great church of this town in the after-noon; the funeral

(1). See her letters of 1710 in Dr. E. C. Godée Molsbergen's excellent study already quoted, p. 245 and following.

(2). Dr. E. C. Godée Molsbergen, p. 185.

(3). *Dagregister* p. 120.

(4). do. p. 353.

“being attended by His Honour” (the Governor-General), “besides all the members of the Council of India and many civil officers of standing and quality, preceded by the Compagnie’s soldatesque of the castle in full arms and by the deceased’s coat of arms carried by the merchant Adriaen van Lier.”

His successor at Malacca Balthasar Bort was more fortunate and rose during the time of his office to the rank of Governor and in 1677 even to that of Councillor Extraordinary, which dignities had also been attained by the first head of the settlement Johan van Twist. It was not the office that determined the title but the person of the office bearer; the same factory may be found alternately in charge of a merchant, upper-merchant, sub-merchant, director, president, commander, governor and even bookkeeper.

The field of action of the Malacca administrators has been geographically defined by Governor-General Antonio van Diemen in a useful statement of all the places “in the Orient possessed and frequented by the Portuguese and Netherlanders¹.” He therein indicates the Peninsula by the unusual name Maleya, now again adopted by British authors. “On the West and East-Coast of Maleya,” writes he, “the Netherlanders possess Malacca with its territory, and they are entitled.inter alia to the commerce of the entire Malay West-Coast, the bandars (= ports) of Pera, Queda, Trangh, Bangery, Oedjongh Salangh and all the islands, as also the trade of the Kingdom of Johor, Patany and Pahan.In the Kingdom of Siam the Netherlanders and Portuguese frequent jointly—amongst other places Sangora.” Every now and then factories were closed, sometimes only to revive again for a shorter or longer period. In the first quarter of the 18th century we find this sphere of action somewhat modified. Valentijn² writes that “several other offices, to wit Peirah, Keidah, Oedjang Salang and Andragiri” (Sumatra) “are subordinate to the Government of Malacca.”

The territory of Malacca where the Compagnie exercised sovereign rights, referred to by van Diemen, was limited to the immediate neighbourhood of the town and to the little district of Naning some slight distance away. Shortly after his arrival the first administrator Johan van Twist “received the oath of allegiance from those of Nanningh and adjacent villages³.” In 1644 Naning rose in arms against the Dutch, together with its North Western neighbour, the little district of Rembau, although they were both vassals of the Compagnie’s ally Johor, which remained neutral, for as the Council of India wrote on July 9th 1645 to Amsterdam, the friendship of this king only consisted in

(1). Tiele. *Bourwstoffen*, III. p. 51/4.

(2). Vol. V.

(3). Pieter van Dam.

his hatred of the Portuguese and had not outlived the latter's expulsion¹. Van Diemen sent Pieter Soury to Johor in order to prevent the estrangement which threatened to arise "from the rebellion of the Manicabers" (Menangkabauers) of "Nanningh and Rombouw, vassals of Johor." The king promised to punish them². In 1677 there were fresh hostilities, as³ "the Malays and Manicabers of the negories Nanningh, Rombouw and Songoodjong, situate about 6 miles in the country to the North of Malacca, the first named being subordinate to us and the other two to Johor, proclaimed as king a new pretender, a descendant of the Manicaber princes on the East coast of Sumatra and whose ancestors had possessed the country of Malacca and to the number of 3700 made repeated attacks on the suburbs of Malacca;" but Bort adds "that these were every time pluckily beaten off⁴." Two years afterwards his successor Governor Jacob Jorissen Pits reports that "the little king of Nanningh and Rombouw has been put to death by his own people who now pray the Compagnie for peace⁵." Sovereign rights over Rembau were not obtained till 1757 when it was ceded to the Compagnie, together with Linggi and Klang, by the ruler of Johor in exchange for her frequent assistance in troops and ships against his enemies⁶. Beyond the vicinity of Malacca the Compagnie further exercised sovereign rights on the Dindings in Valentijn's time; he writes that "postholders were sent thither from here" (*i.e.* Malacca). In 1729 the Batavia Government resolved: "In evidence of Netherlands owner-ship of Dinding the Compagnie's coat of arms shall be renewed⁷."

Some of the localities and countries "to the commerce of which the Netherlanders were entitled" according to van Diemen's statement have been previously referred to; others were of no importance. Pahang does not appear even a single time in the General Resolutions of the Batavia Castle, a sufficient proof of its insignificance to the Dutch. Since the 17th century it formed part of the Johor empire; the treaty with that country of 1685 styles its ruler "king of Johor and Pahang⁸," and as late as 26 November, 1818 another treaty treats Pahang as a subordinate part of Johor. The present separation dates from the English

(1). Tiele. *Bouwstoffen*, III.

(2). Tiele do. III. p. 197.

(3). Letter from Governor Bort of 31st May, 1677. *Dagregister*, p. 213.

(4). *Dagregister*.

(5). *Dagregister* p. 49.

(6). E. Netscher. *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, p. 92.

(7). *Realia*.

(8). E. Netscher, Appendix IV.

era. Although the largest in surface of the Federated Malay States it counts no more than 119,000 inhabitants even in the present day, and is to a great extent a wilderness.

With Johor there were continual relations, mostly of a political character; these were even to survive the Compagnie and in Dutch colonial history this country takes a place of some importance. Throughout the 17th century there is not a single armed conflict between the Compagnie and Johor, but there is a diplomatic struggle for commercial privileges. The first treaty of 1606, already referred to, closed the door on all other traders of European nationality whatsoever. In 1661 the English ask the king's consent for the opening of a lodge but "he has flatly refused this, not "wanting to give us evil suspicion, granting them however free "navigation¹," which is then carried on from the English factory at Surat. Although hardly pleased with this latter concession the Compagnie continues to assist him against his enemies; in 1664 for instance "the President (van Riebeeck) will try to settle the "differences between Johor and Siam²." At one time the Compagnie thinks she has obtained the coveted trade monopoly and freedom of all tolls by her contracts of 1685 and 1689, but these are repudiated by Johor and the agreement of 1713 confers no further rights than permission to trade. Johor then has its period of expansion; it subdues Pahang, Siak, Rhio; it also embraces Linggi and part of the present state of Selangor; it encircles Malacca entirely³. This inevitably led to livelier and more intimate intercourse, despite the Compagnie's reluctance to be drawn into Johor's internal affairs; no profits resulted, only fresh burdens that swelled the inexorable and crushing losses in which Malacca regularly involved the Compagnie. As a reward for assistance rendered, the king, on December 14th 1745, bestows "the country "of Siak in its entirety and for ever to the Hon'ble Comp." But it was seen that this fruit could not be gathered without much fighting and it had to be relinquished. The Siak people by a ruse even got into the Dutch fort at the mouth of their river, looted it and murdered the garrison. In 1756 the Compagnie obtained from Johor the coveted monopoly of the tin trade in Selangor, Klang, Linggi and a promise that no European vessels would be given access to the whole kingdom unless provided with Dutch permits. But the king does not stick to his promise and admits the English. The Dutch Company sinks everywhere in might and strength just when the British India Company is beginning to rise in power; family government, at that time the curse of the home Republic, exerts its influence in the Far East; everyone cares for his own

(1). *Dagregister*.

(2). *Realia*.

(3). See map No. 9 of the useful *Historical Atlas* by H. Hettema Jr, 7th ed. Leiden, 1913.

pocket first, then for his kinsmen and last of all for the Compagnie. Especially in the possessions outside Java her strength fails. Navigation in the Straits is hampered by pirates of all kinds. Numbers of these were hanged in the fortress of Malacca, amongst them English and Dutch; and the Compagnie was compelled to attack Siak which had become a regular pirates' nest. She succeeded and conquered the place in 1761; but the country yielded nothing but losses and was abandoned in 4 years. Bugis warriors from Celebes get the upper hand in Johor; Malacca is threatened in 1783; a whole squadron under captain J. C. van Braam has to be sent to remain master of the situation and to beat the desperadoes off¹. In 1784 the whole "empire of Djohor and Pahang" is ceded to the Compagnie; a resident is to have charge of customs and taxes and the supervision of the administration of justice and of current public affairs. But the Dutch settlement, founded in 1785 at Johor's new capital Rhio², was taken by the Bugis in 1787; the Compagnie had likewise been driven from Selangor in 1785; both were however reoccupied in 1788 without hostilities³.

About the same period Malacca was threatened by its first foreign competitor. The growing China trade of the British needed a port of call on the Malay Peninsula. In 1786 Francis Light, a merchant-captain, succeeded in persuading the ruler of Kedah to cede the island of Penang for that purpose to the British Company, who took possession of it under the name of Prince of Wales' Island in the same year. This acquisition had not been gained for nothing; Kedah had stipulated for an annual indemnity of 30,000 dollars and for support against possible hostilities, especially from Siam, which claimed suzerain rights over Kedah. But once in possession of the island, the Company ignored the conditions agreed upon, refused armed assistance and reduced the indemnity to 10,000 dollars and that for no longer a period than 7 or 8 years⁴. Neither Kedah's protests, nor Light's pleadings with his masters were of any avail; the Company professed to be unable to conclude treaties without the king's approval, declined to go to war with Eastern potentates and resisted payment. In 1789 Light⁵ tried in vain to persuade the prince to accept 4000 dollars per annum against cession of the island for good.

In 1791 a contract was forced upon Kedah which made no mention of the promised military assistance and screwed down the

(1). For an account of these operations see de Jonge. *Het Nederlandsche Zeewezen*. IV. Haarlem, 1861.

(2). P. H. van der Kemp. *De Commissien van den Scheut bij Nacht C. J. Wolterbeek naar Malakka en Riouw in 1818 en 1820*. Bijdragen Kon. Inst. 6th Series, VII. p. 21.

(3). E. Netscher, p. 59-229.

(4). Begbie, p. 90/6.

(5). See his letter of July 1789. Swettenham p. 44.

indemnity to \$6000, exactly one-fifth of what had been agreed at the time of the occupation. In 1800 a second contract raised this to \$10,000, but for this augmentation Kedah had to part with the stretch of land facing Pulu Penang and now called Province Wellesley, as "the Company's people were distressed for procuring timber and the raising of cattle¹." The whole proceedings constituted "a breach of faith which sullied the British name²." This is the opinion of the former Governor and High Commissioner Swettenham, who is on the whole such a strong admirer of his own race. The ruler of Kedah bitterly atoned for his ill-placed confidence. In 1821 his Siamese suzerain invaded his country and laid it waste by fire and sword; he and his son lost the throne, his prime minister was put in prison and poisoned. All this was recorded in 1824 in a pamphlet by John Anderson, Government Secretary at Penang. But the whole edition was immediately confiscated and destroyed; only one copy escaped and was reprinted in later years³.

In 1795 the first stroke of the hour of parting from Malacca sounded for the Dutch. The turn of the tide began with the loss of Ceylon, which was to be followed by that of the Malay Peninsula, Cape Colony, the possessions in India and Guiana west of Surinam. Although the Dutch Republic was openly at war with Great Britain, the late Stadtholder had issued a letter dated from Kew 7th February, 1795 by which, as the head of the Oost Indische Compagnie, he commanded all its chiefs in the East and West to admit English troops as belonging to a friendly power⁴. On the strength of this document a British expedition left Madras in October of the same year "for the purpose of securing the Molucca Islands to the ancient Government of Holland, if it

(1). Martin. *Die Inlandstamme*, etc. p. 135.

(2). *British Malaya* p. 37.

(3). Mr Blagden who has seen the same statement elsewhere, thinks it cannot be literally true. He himself possesses a copy which is undoubtedly part of the suppressed edition. To his knowledge the book, as a book, was never reprinted, but the most material parts of it were reprinted in Logan's *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*.

P. C. H. v. P.

(4). This circular, of which the author has seen an original specimen in the Colombo archives with which those sent to other colonies were identical, runs as follows :

Noble, most Honourable and Pious,
Our Beloved and Faithful :

We have considered it expedient to direct and command you to admit at Trincomalee and elsewhere in the Colony under your Government, the troops that will be sent thither on the part of His Great Britanic Majesty; and to admit into the roads or other safe berth the ships of war, frigates or armed vessels that will be sent thither on the part of His Great Britanic Majesty aforesaid and to consider them as troops and ships of a power in peace and alliance with their High Mightinesses (*i.e.*, the States General of the Netherlands) and who come to prevent the colony from being invaded by the French.

“again should be restored; or in case of their rejecting the offer of our protection finally to reduce them by force¹.”

The expedition touched first at Penang and found the new settlement already numbering 20,000 inhabitants, Klings², Bengalis, Malays, Chinese, Portuguese and Europeans. This rapid development was due to the favourable climate, facilities for ship-building and above all to freedom of trade which, a few years excepted, was accompanied by freedom from duties, a novelty in those days, even in British territory.

The very day after landing at Malacca, the heads of the expedition were entertained at dinner by Governor Abrahamus Couperus. The official report gives the following particulars which are characteristic of the semi-native customs prevailing in the Dutch East Indies at that time, especially at outposts like Malacca. “Madam Couperus was dressed in a mixture between the Malay and Portuguese. She seemed however very affable and well-bred. In the evening she played on the harp and was accompanied by some of her slaves on violins. She chewed betel incessantly as did the other ladies in company and every chair in the room was furnished with a cuspedor to spit in.” The surrender took place without opposition. But the English found the works of the fort and town in better order and more capable of defence than could be supposed from the facility with which it was gained by so small a force as that sent against it. Had the Dutch been true to their trust and assembled the garrisons of Rhio and Perak, as they were ordered from Batavia to do, they certainly might have occasioned us a deal of trouble³.”

The writing of the letter which led to this uneventful surrender was the most lamentable and fatal act of the last and least

Wherewith

Noble Most Honourable and Pious Our Beloved and Faithful, we commend you to God's holy protection

Your friend and well wisher

(Sd.) W. Pr. v. Orange

Kew 7th February, 1795

in the absence of the private secretary

(Sd.) J. W. Boejenk

To the Governor of Ceylon.

(1). Official report of the expedition by W. C. Lennon, principal engineer and secretary to the expedition, published by Prof. J. E. Heeres in “*Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned. Indie.*” 7th series, VI, the Hague 1908.

(2). Or Klingalese, usually called Klingers in the Dagregister. The name owes its origin to the Portuguese word Quelins, which is in its turn derived from the native word Kalinga, an ancient name for Coromandel. The word is now chiefly used in the Straits and Netherlands India to indicate people originating from Coromandel and Malabar, sometimes Indians and Ceylonese in general.

(3). Lennon's report in *Bijdragen*, etc. 7th series, VI. p. 258.

of the Stadtholders. The English who overcome his habitual irresoluteness and prevailed upon him to write it, were fully aware of the chance it opened of a permanent occupation; to wit Lennon's utterance in his report of the expedition, that it was "not unlikely" that "Malacca will permanently remain in our possession¹."

The expedition judged Malacca better situated than Penang "and it is the key of the Straits, since no ship can pass but in sight of it²." Governor Couperus and his troops had to evacuate Malacca; the council, which was for the time being deemed indispensable for legal administration, was retained against its will.

The Dutch factory in Perak under commandant Christoffel Wallbeehm surrendered in the same year³.

The English found at Malacca a population of 14 to 15,000, composed of Malays, Chinese, Klings and Europeans. Agriculture there was none; trade was suffering from the competition of Penang. An absolute trade monopoly was not to the advantage of the English so long as the Dutch held the whole or any considerable part of the Archipelago, as they did throughout this war (1795-1802)—Java, Madura, South Sumatra, Sumbawa and the Timor group⁴. Therefore "the principle of a trade open to all upon certain fixed duties" was introduced⁵. But the British Company was not adverse to the despised Dutch monopoly system in places where it promised to be remunerative. She applied it in the Moluccas and here in Malacca. In 1801 the British resident agreed with the "Panghulu of Nanning" that all the latter's tin had to be supplied to the East India Company at 44 "rixdollars" per 300 katis and the pepper at 12⁶. Besides the inhabitants and chiefs—and the latter were to be henceforth appointed by England—had to abstain⁷ from all commercial intercourse with other foreign nations and with other towns than Malacca. Kedah had to bind itself in 1800 not to admit other Europeans in any part of its territory⁸.

The treaty of Amiens gave Malacca back to the Dutch and in the same year, 11th November, 1802 the Batavia authorities appointed a new Governor named Craussen, "unless orders to the contrary should have been given by the Lords Masters" (Heeren

(1) Lennon's report in *Bijdragen*, etc. 7th series, VI. p. 264.

(2). do. do. do. do. p. 261.

(3). Netscher, p. 238

(4). Conclusion of Prof. Heeres to Lennon's report, p. 365.

(5). do. do. do. p. 266.

(6). Art 5 and 6 of the treaty. In T. J. Newbold's *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, viz. Pinang, Malacca and Singapore*. London 1839. II. p. 454.

(7). T. J. Newbold, arts 7 and 8.

(8). T. J. Newbold, art. 6 p. 458.

Meesters¹). Although the Hon'ble Company had fallen, the old terms survived and some of these survive even at the present day. And perhaps the traces of this grand foundation, great amongst the greatest mercantile corporations, the world has ever known, will never entirely die out.

War, however, soon broke out again and Holland, being under French domination, was once more forced into hostilities with England. Consequently Malacca was not delivered up and in 1807 its fort was demolished for fear that Holland should again enter in possession. If this had to be the case, then the weaker the place the better. Malacca was the base where the British assembled the fleet that was to conquer Java.

After Napoleon's downfall the treaty of Vienna again restored Malacca to the Netherlands, but it was not until 21st September, 1818² that their colours were hoisted there. And in the meantime England had taken care to maintain access to the Peninsula in other places. In 1818 Perak, Selangor and Johor had to sign agreements not to exclude or hamper British trade by treaties with other nations³. As soon as reestablished in Malacca the Netherlands Indian Government took steps to ensure the maintenance of the sovereign rights of the kingdom of the Netherlands, as successor to the Compagnie, by new treaties with the native chieftains. On 26th November, 1818 rear-admiral C. J. Wolterbeek concluded an agreement with the "kingdom of Johore, "Pahang, Riouw and Lingga" by which the chief recognised that he ruled his country as a vassal of the kingdom of the Netherlands; he was placed under a Dutch resident; there was to be no monopoly, the ports were to be open to all nationalities⁴. The insignia of his rank were solemnly handed to him at Rhio in 1823 by Dutch delegates⁵; in other words: they crowned him. With the old neighbours and friends of Rembau the new Dutch Governor J. S. Timmerman Thijssen concluded a treaty in 1819 by which "the Government of Netherlands India, desirous of giving a proof of "the good intentions of the king of the Netherlands towards all "his subjects, renews the treaty of the High Government of "(Netherlands) India of 1759." The raja of Rembau and his chieftains recognised that Government as their lawful authority and promised to show themselves good vassals, their successors to be nominated and sworn in by the Malacca Governor. They further undertook to deliver to the Malacca Government all the tin collected by them or their subjects at the price of 40 rixdollars per 100 catties; and it was stipulated that all passing ships should put

(1). *Realia*.

(2). Netscher.

(3). Newbold, p. 475/82 and Martin, p. 136 and following.

(4). Netscher, p. 257.

(5). Netscher, p. 277.

into Malacca and take out a permit on pain of confiscation¹. And the same year saw the revival of the Dutch treaty with Selangor of 1786 including the tin-monopoly, notwithstanding the above mentioned newly made agreement between the British and that little state².

Also in 1819 an event took place which was going to put an end both to the importance of the town of Malacca and to Dutch domination there. This was the foundation of Singapore. Its history is well known and will only be related here in outline. Thomas Raffles, Lieutenant Governor of Java and its dependencies during the British interregnum, and now only Resident of the small colony of Bencoolen on the West Coast of Sumatra, found it difficult to put up with the restitution of the Archipelago to the Netherlands, endeavoured to keep for his country what he could in spite of treaty obligations and wanted to form a British Batavia, or rather an anti-Batavia. He selected for this purpose the little island of Singapore at the southern-most point of the Peninsula. It had only been occupied since 1811 by one of the high chiefs of Johor with a few hundred followers and formed part of the kingdom of Johor, Pahang, Rhio and Lingga which had been ceded anew to the Netherlands in 1818. The reigning Sultan, who resided within the sphere of influence of the Dutch Resident of Rhio, would not have been in a position to transfer the island to Raffles and the local chief justly considered himself powerless to dispose of it without the Sultan's consent. Then Raffles found a loophole by alleging that the sultan was a usurper and that one of his relatives was the rightful heir to the throne. The latter was found willing to give the desired consent in exchange for a comparatively small sum of money, but apart from that he never entered into the part of pretender and none of his descendants ever ascended the throne, as did however those of the Singapore local chief. The latter was made a party to the transaction, also for a small monetary consideration. Then Raffles started forthwith to build his town.

He met with strong opposition from the Dutch, who objected to the illegal disposing of part of their territory; from the Penang traders in their well-founded apprehension of a formidable rival; and he was even disavowed by his own superiors in India and at home who had not been consulted. On the representations of the Netherlands ambassador, Lord Bathurst blamed Raffles in full parliament³. And on a later occasion, when defending the treaty of 1824, Lord Canning was bound to declare: "I was

(1). Newbold, II. p. 439.

(2). P. H. van der Kemp. *De Stichting van Singapore*. Bijdragen Kon. Inst. LIV. 1902.

(3). *Singapore, Malacca, Java*, by F. Jagor, Berlin, 1866, p. 81/4.

“certainly of opinion that we could not substantiate our title¹.” But the new settlement soon proved of such importance to the English that they imposed silence on their sense of justice rather than to give it up. Admirably situated on the highway to China and the Archipelago, gifted with a magnificent natural harbour and a healthy climate, it had been opened at once to all flags free of duties and charges. When four years old, in 1823, it contained a population of 10,000 and had attracted a trade of two millions sterling; it was on the way to become the emporium for the whole of the Archipelago. Under these circumstances the British Government, without denying the justice of Dutch claims, adopted a policy of delay that would ultimately lead to a situation which it might declare incompatible with the repeal of the annexation. This design was successful.

The Netherlands Indian Government was labouring under other difficulties created by Raffles during his stay at Bencoolen and it began to experience the desire to obtain possession of that colony, insignificant in itself but now competing with Dutch influence in Sumatra. Malacca, outflanked as it was by Penang and Singapore, had considerably lost in importance and was a constant drain on the meagre exchequer. And the chances of regaining Singapore may be judged from Canning’s utterance (1824) which illustrated the point of view of the British Government: “It would be a great mistake to apply to this particular case the general principles of European policy or any high romantic feelings of morality².” When therefore the negotiations for a new colonial treaty, which England had kept dragging on since 1820, were resumed in 1823, it was a foregone conclusion that the Netherlands would relinquish their rights on Malacca and Singapore. This was laid down in the important treaty which was concluded in London on the 17th March, 1824 and which still forms Asia. They thereby more over engaged themselves “never to form the basis of the present colonial possession of the Netherlands in any Establishment on any part of the Peninsula of Malacca or to conclude any treaty with any Native Prince, Chief, or State therein” (art. 10). Bencoolen or, as the treaty styles it, “The Factory of Fort Marlborough and all the English possessions on the Island of Sumatra,” was the compensation. But the promise “that no British Settlement shall be formed on that Island, nor any Treaty concluded by British Authority, with any Native Prince, Chief, or State therein” was subsequently declared by the British Government to be an inadequate reason for withdrawing the objections it had made when Holland wanted to extend its authority over the whole of Sumatra. A fresh sacrifice had then to be made *viz.* of the Dutch possessions on the Coast of Guinea

(1). Dr. E. B. Kielstra. *Het Maleische Schiereiland*, in the Dutch review *Onze Eeuw* June 1913, p. 372.

(2). Netscher p. 280.

which had been valuable as the source of supply of the best soldiers for the Netherlands Indian army.

The treaty split up the Kingdom of Johor into a Dutch and a British part, the former being under the ruling sultan.

Malacca did not recover after its reoccupation by the English in 1825; the harbour silted up and its place had been taken by Singapore and partly by Penang. The Dutch tried to make up for the loss of what Malacca had formerly been to them by constituting Rhio into a free port, but this experiment came too late and was a total failure¹.

Kedah, although previously considered an independent state so as to enable it to make the cession of Penang, was recognised by England in 1826 as a tributary of Siam²: and quite recently in 1909 this territory was obtained from Siam by diplomatic action³, simultaneously with its other Malay provinces Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis, which latter district had been torn from Kedah and made into a separate vassal state by Siam in 1821.

Perak was punished by the Siamese in 1821 shortly after Kedah, but unlike Kedah this state was not recognised by England as tributary to Siam. In the sixties the Perak tin industry attracted a large Chinese colony and the country gained in economic importance. Consequent on internal disturbances England then began to move to obtain a so-called protectorate. In 1874 a British resident was established there as adviser to the sultan. He was murdered but did not die in vain, according to Swettenham⁴, as an expedition sent brought the country under British rule in 1875-6. In 1886 it parted with a stretch of coastland and neighbouring islands forming the Dindings which were added to the Straits Settlements⁵.

Selangor, the Negri Sembilan including Rembau and Pahang were also gradually subdued, partly by force of arms but to a great extent by the continual extension of British influence. These four territories were united by England in 1895 as the Federated Malay States under a British Resident General.

To conclude with Holland's old friend Johor, reduced to the part of the Peninsula that lies to the South East of Malacca, it first sank back to the condition in which some centuries ago it had wanted to borrow a few hundred rixdollars from the Dutch ad-

(1). This effort is now being repeated on a modest scale, Sabang so far at with reasonable results.

(2). Begbie, p. 114/31.

(3). *Azië Gespiegeld*, I. p. 101 and 103.

(4). p. 215.

(5). Martin, p. 136 and following.

miral Matelief. In 1847 the capital only numbered 25 huts¹. In 1855 it was transferred from its old site on the delta of the Johor river (which reaches the sea near the island of Singapore) to the new site of Johor Baharu on the strait opposite that island. As regards its internal administration Johor has maintained its nominal independence, subject to the fact that it belongs to the British sphere of influence; but in reality it is under absolute British supremacy, if only by reason of its immediate neighbourhood to Singapore.

(1). Martin, p. 143 and following.